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Abstract
In the 1930's the Tennessee Valley .Authority developed several methods to
allocate the costs of multipurpose water projects. One of these methods is the
alternate cost avoided method. This paper provides two characterizations of the
alternate cost avoided method, one on a class of cost games with a fixed player
set, the other on a class of cost games with a variable player set using a reduced
game property.
'The author is indebted to P. Borm, T. Driessen, Y. Funaki, S. Tijs and ]. Zarzuelo for helpful




Cost allocation problems occur in many practical situations, where indíviduals work to-
gether in a joint project. In these cases the problem arises of allocating the joint costs
to the participants in the project in a"fair" way. A mathematical tool to analyse this
type of problems is provided b}' cooperative game theory.
Examples of cost allocation problems studied in a game theoretica] context are the set-
ting of airport landing fees (e.g. Littlechild and Owen (1973), Littlechild and Thompson
(1977)), the allocation ofjoint overhead costs of a firm among its different divisions (e.g.
Shubik (1962), Jensen (1977), Hamlen et al. (19ïï)), and the apportioning of costs of
multipurpose water development projects (e.g. Ransmeier (1942), Suzuki and Nakayama
(1976), Loughlin (197ï), Straffin and Heaney (1981), Young et al. (1982)).
Especially the last type of cost allocation problems has a rich history dating back
to the 1930's in which the Tenessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established (see Rans-
meier 1942, Parker (1943)). The problem TVA engineers were confronted with was the
apportioning of costs of projects in the Tennessee River among the different `purposes'
to be served (mainly navigation, flood control, and hydro-electric power). TVA engi-
neers made several proposals to allocate the costs of projects to these purposes. Almost
all these methods begin by allocating the so-called separable cost, to each `participant'
(purpose), and then dividing the remaining nonseparable cost.
Two of the methods developed by the TVA are the egalitarian nonseparable cost
(ENSC) method, which allocates the nonseparable cost equally among the participants,
and the alternate cost avoided (ACA) method, which allocates the nonseparable cost
among the participants in proportion to the `cost savings' made by including a participant
in the joint project instead of developing a separate project only to serve the purposes
of that participant.
A modification of the ACA-method is the separable cost remaining benefit (SCRB)
method. This has become the principal method used by civil engineers to allocate the
costs of multipurpose water projects (see e.g. Inter-Agency Committee on Water Re-
sources (195b)).
A game theoretical base for the ACA-method was established by Gately (1974). Gately
proposed a new solution concept for cooperative games based on a player's "propensity2
to disrupt" the solution. This solution concept has been further generalized by Fischer
and Gately (1975), Littlechild and Vaidya (1976) and Charnes et al. (1978). It was
shown by Straffin and Heaney (1981) that the allocation method proposed by Gately
corresponds precisely to the ACA-method.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of the ACA-
method on a certain class of cost games with a fixed player set as well as on a class of
cost games with a variable player set, using a reduced game property. This is the subject
of section 3. First, in section 2 we discuss the cost allocation problem in a formal game
theoretical context, and recall some of the cost allocation methods proposed by the TVA.
2 Game theory and cost allocation problems
To formulate a cost allocation problem in terms of cooperative game theory, it is mod-
elled as a cost game ( N, c). Here, .N represents a finite set of participants among which
the costs of a joint project are allocated. For example, N can be a set of potential cus-
tomers of a public facility, the divisions of a firm, or municipalities which share a joint
water system, etc. The elements of :v are called players and subsets of .V are called
coalitions. For any coalition S C N, the minimal costs of designing a project for the
purposes of S only are denoted by c(S). In particular, c(0) :- 0, where 0 denotes the
empty set. The function c : 2N -~ R is called the (jointJ cost function. Let CG`v denote
the set of all cost games with player set ;ti'.
Example 1: As an example of a joint cost game based on a cost allocation problem, we
consider the cost allocation problem for the TVA ten dam system. Here the purposes
navigation, flood control and hydro-electric power are denoted as players 1,2, and 3 re-



















Taóle 1. The cost game for the TVA ten dam project ( costs in á 1000).3
Given a cost game (IV,c), the cost allocation problem now becomes to choose a cost
allocation in a"fair" manner. A cost allocation for (IV, c) is a vector x E RN such that
~;EN x; - c(N). Here, x, is the cost allocated to player i E N. The TVA engineers pro-
posed several cost allocation methods. If ,9~~ is a subset of CGN, then a(cost) allocation
method on AN is a map f: AN -~ RN, which assigns to every cost game (N, c) E AN a
cost allocation J(c) E R~~.
Almost all cost allocation methods proposed by the TVA begin by charging every player
a minimal cost, called separable cost, which are the additional cost of including the player
in the project already designed for the other players. Thus, for a cost game (N, c), the
separable cosl SC,(c) oJplayer í E:1' are formally defined by
SC;(c) :- c(N) - c(.ti'`{i}).
To use methods based on the idea above it is reasonable to make the following two
assumptions on the underlying cost garne.
SC,(c) G c({i}) for all i E.ti',




Conditions ( 1) and (Z) are well-known balancedness conditions for cost games. If
SC;(c) ~ c({i}) for some i E N, then it is not favourable to include player i in the
joint project. Condition ( 2) implies that after each player is charged his minimal costs
there is still a positive amount of cost remaining which should be allocated. These
remaining cost are called the nonseparaóle cost and are given by
NSC(c) :- c(N) - ~ SC;(c).
~EN
The easiest way to allocate the nonseparable cost is to divide these cost equally among
the players. This method is called the egalitarian nonseparable cost (ENSC) method,
and it is one of the first allocation methods proposed by the TVA. Thus, for a cost game
(!~',c) the cost allocated to player i E:ti' by the EtiSC-method are4
ENSC;(c) - SC,(c) f I,1-~,INSC(c).
An alternative allocation method is the alternate cost avoided ACA) method, which was
first proposed by Martin Gleaser, a TVA consultant in 1938 (see Ransmeier (1942)). By
this method the nonseparable cost are divided in proportion to c({i}) - SC,(c). Hence,
ACA;(c) :- SC;(c)
f~~~~{c({j})~SC~(c)NSC(c) for all i E N
The number c({i}) - SC,(c) represents the alternate cost avoided by including player i
in thejoint project.
A modification of the ACA-method is the separable cost remaining benefit ~SCRB)
method. If 6(i) is the benefit of the project to player i, then i would not be willing
to pay more than min{b(i),c({i})}. The remaining benefit to player i is defined by
min{b(í),c({i})} - SC,(c). The SCRB-method allocates the nonseparable cost propor-
tional to the remaining benefits. Since in many situations the benefits exceed the alter-
nate costs, the SCRB-method often coincides with the ACA-method.
The mayor drawback of the cost allocation me[hods mentioned above is that they only
take into account the values of the coalitions with 1, ~a~ - 1 and (.v~ players. In partic-
ular, there is no guarantee that the corresponding allocations of these methods are core
elements of the cost game, which means that there might be subcoalitions that have an
incentive to split of from the grand coalition.
From a practical viewpoint however, the advantage of these methods is that in general
they are much easier to compute than game theoretical solution concepts as the Shapley
value (Shapley ( 1953)), the nucleolus (Schmeidler ( 1969)) and the cost gap method
(Driessen en Tijs (1985), Tijs en Driessen ( 1956)), which take into account the values of
al! coalitions.
Moreover, as is shown in e.g. Suzuki and `akayama (1976), Legros ( 1982) and
Driessen and Tijs (1985) there are (large) classes of cost games for which some of the
solution concepts mentioned above coincide with one (or more) of the game theoretical
solution concepts.5
Example 2: For the TVA cost game of example 1 the cost allocations of the ENSC- and
ACA-method are given in table 2 together with the cost allocations corresponding to the
game theoretical solutions mentioned above. Note that in this case the cost allocations
























Table 2. Cost allocation for the TVA cost game by five methods (cost in ~ 1000).
3 Characterizations of the ACA-method
This section further investigates the ACA-method. Attention is restricted to the class
of cost games (1`', c) for which (1) and (2) hold. This class is denoted by F'N and Fm
denotes the class of cost games with m or more players satisfying (1) and (2).
Geometrically, for a cost game (,V, c) E F" the cost allocation ,9CA(c) is the unique
element in the hyperplane {r E Rv~~~,E~r, - c(.N)} which lies on the line segment
with end points (SC;(c)),E,v and (c({i})),E,~- (see figure 1).
ISCi(C)),E:V ~{r E R~ ~~iEN Z~ - C(l~ )}
figure 1.6
Let A C F~. Clearly, the ACA-method satisfies individually rationality on A, i.e.,
ACA;(c) C c({i}) for all i E .N and all (N,c) E A.
Furthermore, the ACA-method satisfies the symmetry property on A, i.e., for all
(N, c) E A and all players i and j that are symmetric in (N, c), i.e., c(SU{i}) - c(SU{~})
for all S C 1V`{i, j}, it holds that ACA;(c) - ACA~(c).
The ACA-method also satisfies invnriance w.r.t. strategic equivalence on A, i.e., for
all (N,c) E A, all k) 0 and all a E R'N, such that (N,kc f a) E A, we have that
ACA(kc ~- a) - kACA(c) -~ a. Here the game (N, kc f a) is defined by (kc f a)(S) :-
kc(S) t~,ES a; for all S C:h'.
Another property of the ACA-method on A is weak proportionality which says that
if (N,c) E A is such that SC;(c) - 0 for all i E N, then AC.A(c) is proportional to the
vector ( c({i}));EN of individual costs.
This weak proportionality property shows great resemblance to the restricted pro-
portionally property of the r-value (Tijs (1981), ( 1987)). Cost games for which each
player's separable cost are zero arise when the increase in the total costs of adding an
extra player can be neglected compared to the total cost of the project.
Similar to the characterization of the r-value by Tijs ( 19S ï) one can prove
Theorem 1: The ACA-method is the unique cost allocation method on FN which
satisfies invariance w.r.t. strategic equivalence and weak proportionality.
Proof: Suppose that f: F'ti' -a R'~' satisfies the two mentioned properties. Let
(.N, c) E F'ti~. It suffices to show that f(c) - AC.-1(c).
Define the game ( N, c) E F,~ by
c(S) :- c(S) -~ SC;(c) for all S C ~~'.
~ES
Then SC,(c) - 0 for all i E:~~. From the weak proportionality property it follows that
there exists an a E R such that for all i E iti'
f,(c) - aê({i}) - a(c({ }) - SC,(c)).
From the strategic equivalence property it follows that for all i E:v7
t~(c) - sc;(c) t I~(~) - sc;(c) f a(c({i}) - sc;(c)).
Using the fact that ~;EN f,(c) - c(N), it easily follows that t(c) - ACA(c). O
The last part of this section provides a characterization of the ACA-method on the class
Fl using a reduced game property. In the literature several types of reduced games have
been considered to provide a foundation of game theoretic solution concepts based on the
consistency principle. ~Ve mention, Hart and ~fas-Colell (1989) for the Shapley value,
Sobolev (1975), Snijders (1991) for the (pre)nucleolus, Peleg (1986) for the core, and
recently, Driessen (1992) for the r-value. .Also the ENSC-method has been characterized
by means of a reduced game property (lfoulin (1985), Driessen and Funaki (1993)). For
a detailed survey on consistency see e.g. Driessen (1991).
The idea behind consistency is the following. Given a cost game, and a cost allocation
for this game, determined by a cost allocation method, imagine that a coalition decides
to renegotiate the allocation within their subgroup. The new situation is described by
a reduced game. A cost allocation method is consistent w.r.t this reduced game if the
new cost allocation within this subgroup is the same as in the original game.
Let (.ti', c) be a cost game, k E.~' and s E R'N a cost allocation. The reduced game
(N`{k}, ck~r) cor-responding to (.~',c) is defined as follows. For S C:h'`{k}
ck.~( S) :- J c( S) if ~S~ C I
11 C(SU {k}) -rk If 2 C ~S~ c ~.v~ - 1.
It should be noted that the reduced game introduced here coincides with the reduced
game of :líoulin (1985) except for the 1-person coalitions.
The interpretation of this reduced game is as follows. In the reduced game the cost of
a 1-person coalition is the same as in the original game. However, if in the reduced
situation the players want to coopecate in a coaltion S, then player k should be involved
and, therefore, the cost of coalition S in the reduced game is the cost of coalition SU {k}
in the original game minus the original cost rk allocated to player k.
Let A C F~ and let m(A) :- min{~.N~ ~(~ti',c) E A}. A cost allocation method f on
.9 satisfies the reduced game property on A if for all (:N,c) E A with n ~ m(A) and alls
k E N it holds that
(i) (N`{k}, ck~~(`)) E A, and
(ii) j;(ck~~(`)) - f,(c) for all i E .N~{k}.
The ACA-method satisfies the reduced game property on the class F3. This is shown in
Lemma 2: The ACA-method satisfies the reduced game property on F3.
Proo~ Let (N,c) E F3 with ~N~ 1 4, and let k E N. We first show that the reduced
game (N`{k},ck,ACA(`)) is an element of F3. Herefore note that for all i E N`{k}
~k,ACA(c)( { }) - c({i}) (3)
and since ~N~ ~ 4 also
SC;(ck,ACA(c}) - c(N) - ACAk(c) - (c(.N`{i}) - ACAk(c)) - SC;(c). (4)
Since (N,c) E F3, it follows that SC,(ck,AC.a(`) ~ ck.ACA(`)({i}) for all i E N`{k}.
It remains to show that
~`
SC,(ck.ACA(c)) ~ Ck.ACAicI(~ ~
{k}) C ~ Ck,ACA(c)({t}).
iEN[`J{k} iEiti-`{k}
Note that for i E N`{k}
SC,(c) C AC,~1(c) G c({i}).
(5)
Then, using (3), (4), and the fact that ck.ACA(`)(t~'`{k}) -~;E,ti.`{k} ACA;(c) the required
inequality (5) is easily obtained.
Norv we show that ACA;(Ck,ACA(c)) -.qCA;(c) for all i E a' `{k}.
Since ACA;(c) - SC;(c) f a(c({i}) - SC,(c)) for all i E N, where ~ is such that
c(.~ )- ~ SC,(c) f ct ~(c({i} - SC,(c)). (6)
~E,Y iE.h'9
Similarly, using (3) and ( 4), we obtain that ,9CA;(ck,.acn(`}) - SC;(c)f(3(c({i})-SG,(c))
for all i E N~{k}, where Q is such that
c(N) - ACAk(c) - ~ SC;(c) -}. p ~ (c({i} - SC;(c)).
~E.ti~`{k} ~EA'`{k}
Subtracting (7) from (6) we obtain
ACAk(c) - SCk(c) t a(c({k}) - SCk(c)) -~ (a - Q) ~(c({i} - SC;(c)).
~E.~'`{k}
Hence,




~~'e now distinguish two cases.
If ~;Etv~{k}(c({i}) - SC,(c)) - 0, then ACA,(c) - SC,(c) for all i E N~ {k}. Since, in
this case,
ck.`'c~~`~(.N ~ {k}) - ~ ACA;(c) - ~ SG,(c) - ~ SC,(ck.acn(~~)
~E.ti'`{k} iE,4'`{k} iE.~~`{k}
it easily follows that .9CA,(ck"ac`~~`~) -.9CA,(c) for all i E!V `{k}.
If ~;E,n~`{k}(c({i}) - SC;(c)) ~ 0, then by (a) a - j3 - 0. Hence, ACA;(ck,ACA(c}) -
ACA;(c) for all i E:V `{k}. ~
Example 3 illustrates that the ~CA-method does not satisfy the reduced game property
on the set FZ. This is due to the fact that by reducing a 3-person game to a 2-person
game the separable costs of the players ma}' change.
Example 3: Let N:- {1,2,3} and define (.h',c) as follows. For S C N
2 if {2, 3} ~ S
c(S) -
4 if {2, 3} C S.10
Clearly, (.~',c) E F~ and .aC.a(c) -(0.'1,2). The reduced game ( {1,2},c3~~e`~t`t) E Fz is
given by c3.`'c~t`~({1}) - c3..ac`'t`t({2}) - 3 and c'.ac`~(`)({1.2}) - 2.
Hence, ACA(c3..acA(`t) - ( 1,1) ~ (0,2) - Í.~1CAi(c),ACAz(c)).
Lemma 3: Let j be a cost allocation method on F3 ~chich satisfies weak proportionality
on F3 `F4 and the reduced game propert} on F3. Then j satisfies weak proportionality
on F3.
Proof Let (.~-,c) E F3 ~~ith ~.`~~ ? 1 be such that SC,(c) - 0 for all i E.ti' and suppose
that j satisfies the ~~eak proportionalit}~ propertc on F3 `Fl~ti'I.
Let k E :~~ and let (.~-`{k},cA ~~~~) be the (~~~~ - 1)-person reduced game of (.~,c). Then
(.ti' `{k},ck~~t`~) E F3 `F~,~-~. Since SC,(c" ~~`~) - 0 for al] i E .~~ `{lL} (cf. (4)), there
exists an Q E R such that
Ii(Ckil~l)
- aCk.i1~1(J7})
- C1C({t}) for all 2 E .~. `{Á'}'
Since f satisfies the reduced game propert~- on F3 it follo~~s that
f~(~) - f~(cx.~i~~ - oc({i}) for all i E .~-~ {k}.
~'ar~~ing k E ~~ leads to
j(c) - ~~~,{1}~.....~i{,,,ii.
a
`o~~~ ~~~e can formulate our maín theorem ~~.hich characterizes the .~C~1-method on Fl.
Theorem 4: The .aC.~-method is the uniyue cost allocation method on Ft ~~-hich satisfies
(i) symmetn~ on F~,
(ii) invaríance ~~~.r.t. strategic equi~~alence on Fl,
(iii) ~~~eak proportionalit}~ on F3 `Fa.11
(i~') the reduced game propertp on F3.
Proof Clearlt', the ACA-method satisfies (i)-(i~~).
Let f be a cost allocation method, defined on Fr, satisfying (i)-(iv). Let (N,c) E Fl.
~~-e sho~~~ that j(c) -.4CA(c). Herefore ~ce distinguish three cases.
If ~N~ - 1, then f(c) - c({1}) -,-1C.4(c).
If ~.~-~ - 3, then (i) and (ii) imply~ that f,(c) - c({i}) ~- i(c(~1') - c({i}) - c(N ~{i})) -
.4C.4,(c) for i - 1, 2.
lf ~.~'~ ~ 3, then theorem 1 and lemnra 3 impl~~ that f(c) - AC.4(c). O
It may' be noted that also the the E`SC-method satisfies sy-mmetry, invariance w.r.t
strategic equivalence and the reduced game property on the set F3. Ho~~~e~.er, this cost
allocation method does not satisf~ ~~~eak proportionality'.
For a cost game (.`',c) E Fr, the cenler of imputation set (ClSJ ealue is defined by
CIS,(c) :- c({z}) ~- ~-,1-~.~(c(.~') - ~ c({J})) for all i E:~~.
J E.~
If in theorem -1 condition (iii) is omitted and condition (i~~) is replaced by' the reduced
game propert} on F, then a characterization of the CIS-~alue on Fr is obtained. It is
left to the reader to sho~~ that the CIS-~-alue is indeed the unique cost allocation method
on Fr ~ehich satisfies s~mmetr~, in~ariance w.r.t. strategic equi~'alence, and the reduced
game property~ on FZ.
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